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Boeing and Airbus: Duopoly in Jeopardy?
John Olienyk and Robert J. Carbaugh
Abstract
For decades, Boeing and Airbus have struggled for dominance in the large commercial air-
craft market. In 2010 and 2011, the World Trade Organization ruled that each firm has received
illegal subsidies from the governments of the United States and the European Union, which have
enhanced their competitive positions. This paper considers the nature of these rulings and the
future competitive environment in the global jetliner industry.
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 Recent rulings by the World Trade Organization (WTO) have focused 
attention once again on the battle between Boeing and Airbus for dominance in the 
market for large commercial jetliners.  The latest findings by the WTO are that 
both Airbus and Boeing have been recipients of illegal subsidies from their 
respective governments, and that these subsidies have given each firm unfair 
advantages in the marketplace.  These rulings come as no surprise to most 
observers.  Both the European Union and the United States have a long history of 
subsidizing the manufacturing of civilian jetliners.  In this paper, as a follow-up to 
two papers that we have written for this journal (Carbaugh and Olienyk, 2002 and 
2004) on competition between Boeing and Airbus, we briefly review the history of 
subsidies in the commercial jetliner market and analyze the implications of the 
recent WTO rulings for the nature and composition of the market going forward. 
 
The Birth of Airbus  
 
Airbus was founded in the late 1960s in the hope of preserving the remnants of 
Europe’s fragmented commercial jetliner manufacturing base, consolidating it, and 
growing it into an international competitor.  At that time, the global market for 
large commercial jetliners was overwhelmingly dominated by American firms.  
Boeing, Lockheed and Douglas Aircraft controlled about 90% of the market.  The 
governments of France, Germany, Britain and Spain recognized that in order to 
meet the challenge from the Americans and overcome the huge barriers to entry in 
the industry, they needed to combine their resources.  In 1970 the Airbus 
consortium was officially established, and the governments of the four countries 
made major commitments for financial support of this enterprise. This support 
came largely in the form of loans at below-market rates to fund the bulk of the 
development costs for the A300, the first airliner produced by this consortium.  
Government loans were also provided to European suppliers of Airbus, particularly 
Rolls-Royce, which produced the engines that were used to power the Airbus 
aircraft. 
This method of financing, called launch aid, has been utilized to support the 
development of the entire family of jetliners now produced by Airbus, and has 
contributed significantly to the growth of Airbus.  As time passed, this funding 
evolved from direct grants to reimbursable advances that were linked to sales. 
Under this system, loans from Europe’s governments are repaid gradually with 
each aircraft or engine that is sold.  However, if sales fail to reach specified goals, 
the loan is not fully repaid.  Thus, the governments assume a portion of the market 
risk of developing new aircraft or engines.  This arrangement reduces market risk 
for Airbus and its suppliers, and gives them the ability to borrow in the open market 
at lower rates than they would otherwise have to pay for additional financing that 
they might require. 
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  Consolidation in the United States   
 
As the Airbus experiment unfolded, changes in the marketplace occurred on the 
other side of the Atlantic as well.  Lockheed lost a huge gamble when its L-1011 
wide-body jet failed to attain profitability, and the firm withdrew from commercial 
aircraft production in the early 1980s.  Production problems with its DC-8 and 
DC-9 jetliners, along with the cost of development of the DC-10, forced Douglas to 
merge with McDonnell Aircraft, a major producer of military aircraft, in 1967.  
Douglas Aircraft operated as a separate unit within McDonnell Douglas, but 
continued to be plagued by production problems and tepid sales.  Weakness in its 
commercial aircraft division ultimately caused McDonnell Douglas to seek a 
merger with Boeing, and the two firms merged in 1997.  This merger left Boeing 
as the sole producer of large commercial jetliners in the United States and resulted 
in an effective duopoly in the global market, with Airbus as the only other major 
competitor.   
Although the U.S. government does not provide launch aid or loans to 
Boeing (nor to engine manufacturers such as General Electric or other Boeing 
suppliers) for new development programs, it has received “indirect” subsidies.  
For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) supports 
aeronautics and propulsion research that is shared with Boeing.  Research 
sponsored by the Department of Defense creates technological spin-offs that are 
reflected in commercial jetliner innovation, most notably in aircraft engines and 
aircraft design.  Furthermore, several state and local governments, particularly the 
states of Washington, Illinois and Kansas, provide tax breaks to Boeing, which has 
production facilities in those states. 
 
The 1992 Accord 
 
As Airbus began to increase its market share and establish itself as a viable 
competitor, Boeing became increasingly vocal about the unfairness of the launch 
aid that Airbus received.  Airbus responded by drawing attention to the indirect 
subsidies received by Boeing.  As sales of the Airbus A-320 began to chip away at 
sales of the popular Boeing 737 in the latter part of the 1980s, the debate became 
much more heated.  This resulted in both sides coming to the bargaining table, and 
in 1992 they agreed on limitations on the level of subsidies.  Launch aid for Airbus 
was limited to 33 percent of development costs and indirect subsidies to Boeing 
were limited to 3 percent of revenue.   
However, as Boeing continued to lose market share to Airbus in the ensuing 
years, trade frictions intensified once again.  In 2004, Boeing accused Airbus of 
violating the provisions of the 1992 pact and renounced the agreement.  Trade 
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 representatives from the United States and the European Union attempted to 
negotiate a settlement to the dispute in 2005, but their efforts were unsuccessful.  
Boeing filed a suit at the WTO, claiming that Airbus received illegal subsidies from 
European governments.  Airbus immediately retaliated by filing a suit against 
Boeing, claiming that the federal and state subsidies received by Boeing were 
illegal. (Platzer, 2009). 
 
The 2010 and 2011 Rulings 
 
The first of the WTO’s rulings in the case was announced in June, 2010.  The 
WTO found that the government loans to Airbus, particularly those made to 
support development of the huge Airbus A380, contained elements of illegal 
subsidy and that these subsidies should be halted immediately.  The launch aid 
was found to violate international trade regulations, resulting in a competitive 
disadvantage for Boeing.  The government loans in question were priced at below 
market rates and had overly generous repayment terms.  This decision could 
potentially result in Airbus having to repay or restructure billions of dollars in past 
aid or risk allowing the United States to retaliate by increasing tariffs on products 
imported from Europe. Airbus has filed an appeal, claiming that the ruling is 
incorrect.  The WTO ruling on the Airbus appeal is expected later in 2011.  
Although the WTO cannot force countries to eliminate subsidies, it can authorize 
the country where the harmed company resides to retaliate with trade sanctions of 
an equal amount, giving each side an incentive to claim maximum harm.  It is up to 
the losing government to define its compliance in a proposal agreed to by the 
winner. 
Airbus officials emphasize that the WTO’s decision does not rule out 
launch aid in principle, indicating that Airbus fosters competition that facilitates 
healthy choice for its customer airlines. They also claim that the WTO’s decision 
does not imply that the subsidies have caused material injury to Boeing in the form 
of lost sales and profits.  However, Boeing officials have declared that the 
landmark decision is good news for aerospace workers in America who for decades 
have competed against a heavily subsidized Airbus.  The decision should “level 
the playing field” and provide a vital precedent for other Airbus products or other 
nations with intentions to enter the commercial jetliner business, according to 
Boeing. 
 In February, 2011, the WTO issued a separate report declaring that Boeing 
received illegal subsidies from the U.S. government, to the detriment of Airbus.  
The WTO found that some funding provided by the U.S. Department of Defense 
and NASA resulted in illegal subsidies.  Support for Boeing from the states of 
Washington, Illinois, and Kansas was also deemed an illegal subsidy.  Although 
Airbus claimed in its filing that Boeing received about $24 billion in illegal 
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 subsidies from state and federal governments in the United States, the initial report 
of the WTO did not reveal how much of the aid received by Boeing was illegal.  
This data will be forthcoming later in 2011 when the WTO makes its report 
available to the public. 
 Thus far, Boeing has acknowledged the receipt of $2.6 billion in improper 
subsidies.  As for Airbus, it claims that the WTO ruling, when made public, will 
show that without those illegal subsidies Boeing would not have been able to 
launch the 787.  All in all, Airbus estimates that it has lost at least $45 billion 
through lost sales and lower prices as a result of Boeing subsidies. 
 Boeing and Airbus have each claimed victory in the subsidy dispute.  
Boeing contends that the rulings are completely separate and deal with very 
specific issues.  According to Boeing, the WTO ruled clearly in 2010 that all 
government money provided to Airbus for development of new aircraft is an illegal 
subsidy and must cease.  That debate is over and it is now time for compliance, 
according to Boeing.  Boeing has also stated that it is prepared to accept 
compliance with a WTO ruling regarding its illegal subsidies.  However, Airbus 
has emphatically resisted abandoning launch aid.  It views the two rulings as a key 
to a future negotiated settlement by Europe and the United States under which 
launch aid and indirect subsidies will continue but they will be subject to specified 
limits, similar to the 1992 agreement. 
According to Airbus, only when the two companies terminate litigation and 
begin negotiating will a basis be created for a level playing field in global aircraft 
manufacturing.  Most industry experts agree that negotiation between the United 
States and the European Union remains the only reasonable way out.  
Unfortunately, such negotiations in the past have dragged on for years, and while 
Boeing and Airbus dither, the market environment is changing. 
 
The Evolving Competitive Environment 
 
Manufacturers of civilian commercial aircraft are normally divided broadly into 
two classes.  In one class are the producers of large civilian aircraft, those with 100 
or more seats.  This market segment is a duopoly shared by Boeing and Airbus as 
producers of commercial jetliners and General Electric, Pratt and Whitney, and 
Rolls Royce as producers of jet engines.  To spread their risk and decrease the cost 
of capital investment in new products, these firms are increasingly engaging in 
multinational joint ventures and creating partnerships with firms in countries such 
as China and Japan.  The other class of producers is comprised of firms that 
manufacture smaller jetliners, those with fewer than 100 seats.  This market for 
regional jets is dominated by Canada-based Bombardier and Brazil-based Embraer.  
These firms have displaced European manufacturers of regional jets in the global 
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 the 100-plus seat jetliner category. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2005). 
 Bombardier is developing two new aircraft to compete in this market.  The 
CS100 and the CS300 will have seating capacity in the 110 to 130 range.  These 
planes will be built partly of composite materials and will burn 20 percent less fuel 
per passenger mile than models currently on the market.  The maiden flight of the 
first CSeries prototype is scheduled for 2012, with first deliveries in 2013.  
Bombardier has 90 firm orders for these aircraft.  Embraer has had aircraft of 
similar size in service for several years.  The two largest members of Embraer’s 
E-Jet family of aircraft, the E190 and E195, have seating capacity in the 98 to 122 
range.  Airlines from around the world are currently flying a combined total of 
more than 360 of these aircraft.  These CSeries and E-Jet aircraft are in direct 
competition with the smaller versions of the Boeing 737 and the Airbus A320 
family of aircraft. 
 Additional competition is springing up in other parts of the globe.  Russian 
manufacturers have recently produced the first new civilian airliner since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  The Sukhoi Superjet 100 is a 75 to 95 seat aircraft 
that its manufacturers claim is more efficient and less expensive to operate than 
Bombardier and Embraer aircraft of similar size.  Sukhoi has more than 200 orders 
for the plane so far, from buyers in Thailand, Indonesia, Hungary and Mexico as 
well as Russia.  The first deliveries are scheduled for the first quarter of 2011, and 
there are plans to build stretched versions of this aircraft that would have greater 
seating capacity.  Sukhoi’s civilian aircraft division is 25 percent owned by the 
Italian conglomerate Finmeccanica, which will make it easier for Sukhoi to 
penetrate western markets.  Another Russian aircraft manufacturer, Irkut, has 
recently signed a contract with the Russian government to continue research and 
design work on a large commercial aircraft.  The Irkut MS-21 will come in three 
variants, with seating capacity ranging from 150 to 212.  Projected completion of 
the first prototype is scheduled for 2013, with first deliveries scheduled for 2016.  
It is important to remember that while large commercial aircraft are not currently 
being built in Russia, the Russians have shown in the past that they have the 
capability to produce significant numbers of such aircraft. 
Historically, the Asian aerospace industries have produced a steady stream 
of failed commercial aircraft endeavors.  Most ventures, such as South Korea’s 
plans in the 1990s to manufacture a 50-seat regional jet, and several attempts by 
Japanese firms during the 1960s to 1990s to produce a commercial aircraft, never 
got beyond the drawing board.  The Indonesian government pumped billions of 
dollars into the development of a regional jet in the 1990s.  Two prototypes were 
built, but the project was ultimately abandoned.  The Chinese attempted to 
produce what was essentially a copy of the Boeing 707 in the 1960s, but that project 
did not go beyond the prototype stage. 
  
market and are beginning to compete against Boeing and Airbus in the lower end of 
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 However, Japan’s Mitsubishi has recently re-entered the regional jet 
market.  The inaugural flight of the 88-seat MRJ90 is scheduled for 2012, with the 
first deliveries scheduled in early 2014.  Mitsubishi already has 65 firm orders for 
the MRJ90, and it is preparing to launch a larger, 100-seat model as well.  In 
addition, Japanese firms in total are responsible for building about 20 percent of 
Boeing’s 777 and about 35 percent of the new Boeing 787.  The technology 
transfer implied in this type of arrangement increases the possibility that Japanese 
manufacturers can support the development of larger aircraft in Japan in the future. 
 
The China Factor 
 
In the near future, the greatest threat to the Boeing-Airbus duopoly in large aircraft, 
and the dominance of Bombardier and Embraer in the regional jet market, will 
likely come from China.  Like its Asian neighbors, China has had some false starts 
in its attempts to produce indigenous civilian jetliners over the past forty years.  
But all of that is in the past.  The large increases in per capita income resulting 
from the rapid economic growth in China are creating significant increases in 
demand for air travel within the country, and the Chinese government intends to 
ensure that much of that demand is met with new regional jets and large 
commercial aircraft developed and manufactured in China. 
In 2008 the Chinese government launched the Commercial Aircraft 
Corporation (COMAC).  COMAC is a consortium of Chinese aerospace firms 
brought together to pursue a single goal – to develop and produce of commercial 
jetliners in China.  COMAC immediately took control of a regional jet project in 
China that was already under development.  Development of the ARJ-21 began in 
2002, and its maiden flight was in late 2008. This aircraft has seating capacity of 70 
to 95 passengers, and by late 2010 it boasted 240 firm orders, mostly from Chinese 
airlines.  The first deliveries are scheduled for late 2011.   
A greater potential threat to Boeing and Airbus will come in the form of 
COMAC’s C919.  The C919 will be a new entrant in the large commercial aircraft 
market, with passenger capacity of 168 to 190.  Its maiden flight is scheduled for 
2014, with first deliveries slated for 2016.  The C919 will be constructed using 
lightweight carbon composites and will be powered by new fuel-efficient engines.  
Its designers anticipate that it will be 12 to 15 percent more fuel efficient than 
comparable Boeing and Airbus aircraft.  While this aircraft has been developed by 
Chinese engineers and will be produced in China, its engines and internal systems 
will come largely from western aviation technology firms, including GE Aviation, 
Honeywell, and Eaton Corp.  These foreign suppliers will work with Chinese 
firms in joint ventures to produce the components.  This structure will, of course, 
involve substantial technology transfer as the Chinese partners in these ventures 
gain knowledge and experience from working with foreign suppliers on each 
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 component part of the aircraft.  Moreover, additional technology transfer is taking 
place in Tianjin, where Airbus has built a complete production line for the Airbus 
A320, and aircraft are being delivered from that facility to fill current orders from 
Chinese airlines.  Several Chinese firms also serve as subcontractors to Boeing. 
The C919 project is indicative of China’s resolve to become a global power 
in the aviation industry.  The original plan had been for the first delivery of the 
C919 to occur in 2020, but with the creation of COMAC and by putting the C919 
on a fast track, China has sent a strong message to the rest of the industry that it 
intends to become a major player not only in China, but in the global market as 
well.  By pushing this initiative, the Chinese government is showing its 
determination to accelerate the evolution of its industrial base from that of a 
low-cost producer of cheap labor-intensive products to one characterized by 
technologically advanced, locally designed and engineered, high value-added 
production. 
Success in the aircraft industry is an important component of this vision of 
the Chinese government.  Such success would have a positive impact on a host of 
other industries related to the aviation industry, such as electronics and material 
sciences.  But success is not assured.  Despite recent progress, the Chinese 
aircraft industry still faces major challenges.  The commercial aviation business 
has very high entry costs and the established firms -- Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier, 
and Embraer -- will not sacrifice market share quietly.  Also, airlines insist on 
quality, reliability, safety and support as much as they do a competitive price.  
Given China’s substandard reputation in product quality, airline executives might 
well be skeptical about making major commitments to Chinese aircraft. (Blitzinger, 
2010)  That said, if the same resolve and ability to marshal vast amounts of 
resources that went into the construction of the Three Gorges Dam and the 
development of the Chinese space program and other megaprojects are directed 
toward the commercial airline industry, the odds of a positive outcome may be 
quite good. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Boeing and Airbus have dominated the market for large commercial aircraft for the 
past three decades.  In recent years they have split the market almost equally, with 
a slight edge to Airbus.  In 2010, Boeing delivered 462 jetliners while Airbus 
delivered 510.  Up to now, the two firms have been protected by very large 
barriers to entry.  That protection, however, is weakening as other firms are 
beginning to enter the lower end of this market.  This is an important issue for 
Boeing and Airbus, since the 737 and A320 families of aircraft accounted for about 
80 percent of deliveries and a little more than half the dollar value of sales for each 
of these firms in 2010. 
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 To meet the challenge from these new competitors, Boeing and Airbus have 
several options.  One option is to make small design changes and install more 
efficient engines to reduce operating costs for their smaller aircraft.  Another is to 
completely re-engineer these planes and essentially produce new models in this 
market class.  A third is to maintain the status quo and depend on their reputation 
for quality and service to fend off these competitors.  
Whatever course of action Boeing and Airbus take, what might be most 
troublesome for them is the path that these new competitors are taking to compete 
for market share.  While both Boeing and Airbus have been found guilty by the 
WTO of benefitting from illegal government subsidies, their new competitors have 
been receiving substantial government support as well.  This can be seen most 
directly in the fact that the central government of China and the regional 
government of Shanghai own a substantial stake in the Chinese consortium 
COMAC.  As another example, Bombardier is using about $1 billion in launch aid 
from the governments of Canada and Britain for development of its CSeries 
aircraft.  The British government has also provided subsidies to Bombardier as a 
way of keeping some its production in Northern Ireland, which is an economically 
depressed area.  Ironically, Bombardier has charged that the rapid growth that 
Embraer has recently been experiencing has been supported by large subsidies 
from the Brazilian government.  This is after the WTO found that both 
Bombardier and Embraer were guilty of taking advantage of illegal subsidies in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s.  Embraer has denied the most recent charges and has 
pointed to the direct government support that Bombardier is receiving.   
The Boeing-Airbus subsidy dispute is thus only part of a much larger issue.  
Resolution of this conflict has implications not only for how Boeing and Airbus 
will compete with each other in the future, but also how successful the new rivals 
will be.  If Boeing and Airbus continue to ignore the trade regulations set by the 
WTO, they create a precedent for other competitors to follow.  The result could be 
that governments will feel that they have carte blanche to support their domestic 
aircraft manufacturers at will, thus bringing the entire notion of free trade into 
doubt.  For this reason, we feel that it is vitally important for trade representatives 
from the United States and the European Union, in concert with Boeing and Airbus, 
to expedite negotiations and agree to a comprehensive set of rules regarding 
government subsidies that would be binding for all members of the WTO.  
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